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As of July 1940, the European phase of what would ultimately 
become the Second World War had been underway for some ten 
months. Having defeated Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, 
Holland, Belgium and France in a series of swift, decisive 
campaigns, Nazi Germany reigned supreme in Europe west of the 
Soviet union. Yet, all was not well in the Nazi camp. Despite 
the enormous military successes won by Germany's armed forces 
since September 1939, Adolf Hitler faced a strategic dilemma, a 
strategic dilemma caused by Great Britain's obstinate refusal to 
make peace. 
Ultimately, Hitler--believing that Britain's refusal to come 
to terms was based, in large part, on the hope that Russia would 
eventually enter the war as an ally--chose to solve Germany's 
strategic dilemma with an invasion of the Soviet Union. 
Codenamed Operation Barbarossa, the German attack on soviet 
Russia commenced on 22 June 1941. Achieving complete tactical 
and strategic surprise, German forces, numbering more than three 
million men, quickly penetrated Soviet defenses, scored a series 
of impressive victories, and advanced rapidly into the heart of 
European Russia. By the beginning of December 1941, German 
forces had conquered approximately five hundred thousand square 
miles of territory, had inflicted several million casualties, and 
sat in position to capture Moscow. In the end, however, a quick, 
decisive victory over soviet Russia, which had been the chief 
strategic objective of Barbarossa, eluded Hitler, the result 
being a war of attrition that Germany, in retrospect, had little 
chance of winning. 
In the years following the Second World War, numerous German 
soldiers, officers in particular, who survived Barbarossa spent a 
considerable amount of time trying to explain why the Wehrmacht 
failed to achieve victory over soviet Russia in 1941. These 
explanations pinpoint, among other things, tactical and strategic 
mistakes committed by Hitler, the harsh nature of Russia's 
climate, Soviet numerical superiority, and even the seemingly 
superhuman nature of the Russian peasant soldier. 
In the pages that follow, I will examine Operation 
Barbarossa and the German failure to win the expected quick, 
decisive victory in 1941. Special attention will be devoted to 
German explanations of this defeat and how these explanations 
have influenced the historiography of Barbarossa and the fighting 
on the Eastern Front. Finally, I will offer my own analysis of 
why Hitler's military machine failed in its endeavor to defeat 
the Soviet union in 1941. 
To fully comprehend Operation Barbarossa, one must fIrst understand that the 
invasion and conquest of the Soviet Union was part of a foreign policy program, 
developed by Adolf Hitler, that envisaged a sequence of four wars.! The fIrst two of 
these wars, one against Czechoslovakia and one against France and Great Britain, were 
designed to secure Germany's southern and western flanks and thereby pave the way for 
the third conflict, the confrontation with Russia. This conflict in tum was to provide 
Germany with the continental foundation from which she could embark on her fourth war, 
a showdown with the United States of America that would end in German world 
domination.2 
For Hitler, the intended war against Russia was to be, fIrst and foremost, a war of 
territorial conquest that would bring an enormous land area upon which the Nazi regime 
could resettle ethnic Germans drawn from various parts of Europe. Here, one needs to 
understand that the Nazi dictator saw Germans and those of Germanic blood as members 
of a superior race, the so-called Aryan race, which was engaged in a desperate life-and­
1 Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Germany's War for World Conquest and 
the Extermination of the Jews," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 
34 (Fall 1996): 122. 
2 Not all historians agree with the world domination 
interpretation. In general, there exist two schools of thought 
on Hitler's ultimate foreign policy aims. One school, 
represented by Hugh Trevor-Roper, Eberhard Jaeckel, and Norman 
Rich, argues that Hitler's final aim was limited to the 
conquest of Lebensraum in eastern Europe. The other school, 
the dominant one, asserts that the fuehrer harbored global 
ambitions. Among the most prominent members of the "globalist" 
interpretation are Andreas Hillgruber, Klaus Hildebrand, Jost 
Duefflor, Jochen Thies, and Gerhard Weinberg. For a thoughtful 
discussion of the historiographical debate on Hitler's foreign 
policy, see Ian Kershaw, "Nazi Foreign Policy: Hitler's 
'Program' or 'Expansion without Object'?" in The Nazi 
Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 2nd 
ed., (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), pp. 107-130. 
2 
death struggle against a whole host of inferior races, with the Jews being by far the most 
inferior and most dangerous. In Hitler's warped mind, victory in this struggle--and the 
concomitant survival of civilization--depended, in part, upon the German race having 
access to a sufficient amount of agriculturally productive living space (Lebensraum).3 
Because he perceived, quite inaccurately, that Germans lacked sufficient living space, 
Hitler concluded that there were no visible alternatives but to conquer the territory needed 
and to exterminate and/or enslave the indigenous population.4 In both Mein Kampf 
(published in two volumes, 1925 and 1926) and his Zweites Buch (unpublished 1928), the 
Nazi leader pointed out that the space Germany needed was to be found in eastern Europe, 
in Russia and her vassal states in particular. 5 
********************************************************* 
3 Good analyses of Hitler's ideology are to be found in 
Gerhard L. Weinberg, "The World Through Hitler's Eyes," in 
Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German 
History (New York: cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 30­
53 and Eberhard Jaeckel, Hitler's World View: A Blue Print For 
Power (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1972). 
4 In Hitler's view, population could be adjusted to a given 
space, or space could be adjusted to the popUlation. Believing 
the former would lead to racial decay and was the strategy of a 
racially weak people, the Nazi leader, from the mid-1920s, 
advocated the adjustment of space to the population: 
territorial conquest. See Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. 
Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), pp. 131-139. 
5 Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 654-655 and Hitler's Secret Book, 
trans. Salvator Attanasio (New York: Bramhall House, 1961), p. 
139. 
3 
Planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union began in earnest in the summer of 
1940, roughly eleven months before Operation Barbarossa began. The planning process 
was inaugumted on 31 July, when Hitler, during a meeting at his mountain retreat in 
Bavaria, announced his intention to attack the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941. The 
Nazi dictator explained this decision by linking Great Britain's refusal to make peace with 
hoping that Russia would eventually enter the war as a Gennan ally. Having announced 
his desire to attack Russia, Hitler ordered the Army High Command 
(OKH/Oberkommando des Heeres) to work out an operational plan. 6 
The OKH as well as the OKW produced plans which outlined an invasion of the 
Soviet Union. The OKH plan, produced by the staff of General Erich Marcks, which 
called for German troops to conduct a campaign along a broad front in four stages. The 
main push was to be directed towards Moscow. The plan established by the staff of 
General Marcks established that the final goal, a line from Archangel in the north to 
Rostov in the south, would require nine to seventeen weeks to accomplish. The navy was 
to control the Baltic sea lanes, and the air force was to support the army. A parallel OKW 
(Oberkommando der Wehrmachtl Armed Forces High Command) plan was prepared by 
Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg that advocated primarily a northern push rather 
than one against Moscow utilizing two anny groups. The recommended course of attack 
placed the main blow in the North. The major task of the Navy would be to secure 
6 Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobson, The Halder War 
Diary 1939-1942 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), pp.231­
232. Field-Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch began planning for 
i 	 a 1941 campaign against the soviet Union, prompted by Hitler's 
comments of 31 July (see pages 244-245 concerning thei 
conference at Hitler's mountain retreat in Bavaria). 
I 
i 
~ 
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naval forces to break out. 7 
Additional planning and war games took place during November and early 
December. Although Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and others during these months warned 
Hitler of the dangers of a possible two-front war, he remained committed an attack against 
the Soviet Union. On December 5, General Halder presented the army plan to the fuhrer. 
Resembling the previous army studies and drafts, this version proposed three primary 
thrusts. One directed an advance out of East Prussia toward Leningrad. The second 
directed an advance from Poland toward Minsk and Smolensk. The third directed an 
advance from the south toward Kiev. An eventual offensive toward Moscow was also 
featured. Halder's plan estimated that a total of 105 infantry and 32 armored and 
motorized infantry divisions would be necessary for conducting the entire operation. 
While Hitler agreed to the army proposal, he indicated his preference for concentrating on 
economic goals. The decision as to whether to move directly toward Moscow was left 
open. The plan was then turned over to the OKW to draft the implementing directive. 8 
On December 18, Hitler signed Directive Number 21.9 Generally it conformed to 
the OKH plan, but there existed an important alteration. Reflecting General von 
Lossberg's view, Directive 21 provided that German forces were to capture Leningrad and 
Kronstadt. It should be emphsized that the primary effort of the invasion, as stated in 
Directive No. 21, was the destruction of the bulk of the Red Army by "deep penetrating 
7 Barry A. Leach, German Strategy Against Russia (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), p.255. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See Appendix I. 
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armored spearheads" from the north, center and south. This trrst, decisive stage was 
expected to take eight to ten weeks. The remaining Russian solders were then to be 
pursued relentlessly. During the second stage, besides taking Moscow, German 
formations were to seize the economically important Donets River basin in the south. The 
final objective was a line stretching from the Volga River to Archangel. The area to the 
east, e~'pecially the Ural industrial complex, was expected to be neutralized by the German 
Air Force. Finnish and Rumanian units, plus other Allies later, were to assist in the north 
and the south. Preparations for the operation were to be concluded by May 15.10 
On 22 January 1941, OKH issued a deployment directive of its own. 11 The 
following is a description in detail of the deployment OKH set forth concerning the 
invasion of Russia. 
Army Group South was to drive its strong left wing with mobile forces in the lead 
towards Kiev, destroy the Russian forces in Galicia and in west Ukraine while they were 
still west of the Dnieper, and achieve the early capture of the Dnieper crossings at and 
below Kiev for the continuation of operations on both sides of the river. The operation 
was to be conducted so that the mobile formations from the Lublin area would be 
concentrated for the breakthrough towards Kiev. The 11th Army was to protect the area 
of Rumania vital to the German war economy against any attempted Russian 
counteroffensive. The 17th Army was to break through the enemy border defenses 
10 Alan F. Wilt, War from the Top (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), p.156 
11 Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals 
(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951) Vol.X, Case 12, 
pp.960-964. 
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northwest of Lemberg (Lvov) and reach the area of Vinnitsa-Berditchev. The 6th Army 
was to break through the enemy front on both sides of Luck in cooperation with elements 
of Panzer Group I and proceed to Zhitomir. 12 
Army Group Center was to annihilate and encircle the enemy in White Russia by 
driving forward the strong forces on its wings. It was to win the area around Smolensk 
and achieve cooperation between its mobile troops and Army Group North. This 
cooperation was the prerequisite for the destruction of the enemy forces fighting in the 
Baltic states and the Leningrad area. Panzer Group 2 was charged with the responsibility 
of preventing the concentration of enemy forces in the upper Dnieper region. Panzer 
Group 3, in cooperation with the 9th Army, was to meet Panzer Group 2 and achieve the 
destruction of the enemy forces between Bialystok and Minsk. Also, it was to prevent the 
concentration of enemy forces in the upper Dvina region. The 4th Army was to cross the 
Bug River and thereby open the way to Minsk for Panzer Group 2 and protect its southern 
flanks. Ultimately, the 4th Army was to reach the Dnieper. The 9th Army in cooperation 
with Panzer Group 3 was to break through the enemy forces west and north of Grodno, 
drive towards Lida-Vilna, establish contact with the 4th Army and destroy the enemy in 
the area between Bilaystok and Minsk. 13 
Army Group North was to destroy enemy forces in the Baltic area and deprive the 
Russian fleet of its bases by occupying the Baltic harbors including Leningrad and 
Kronstadt. It was to break through the enemy front with its main effort towards Dvinsk, 
12 Leach, German strategy Against Russia, pp.263-269. 

13 Ibid. 
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thrust across the Dvina, and prevent the withdrawal of Russian forces eastward from the 
Baltic region. It was also to achieve the conditions for a further swift drive towards 
Leningrad. Panzer Group 4 was to break through the enemy front between Wystiter Lake 
and the Tilsit-Shaulen highway. It was then to thrust to the Dvina at and below Dvinsk 
and e~1ablish bridgeheads across the river. The 16th Army in cooperation with Panzer 
Group 4 was to break through the enemy with its main effort on both sides of the road 
Ebenrode-Kovno, reach the north bank of the Dvina, and reach the Optschka area as soon 
as possible. The 18th Army was to break through the enemy on its sector with its main 
concentration on and east of the Tilsit-Riga highway, and was to destroy the enemy forces 
southwest of Riga by thrusting most of its forces over the Dvina at and below 
Stockmannshof. 14 
The task of the Luftwaffe was to eliminate as far as possible all interference by the 
Russian Air Force and to support the main operations of Army Groups Center and South. 
During the main operations the Luftwaffe was to concentrate its efforts against the Red 
enemy Air Force and in immediate support of the Army. The Navy was to prevent enemy 
naval forces from breaking out of the Baltic. After the elimination of the Russian fleet, 
the Navy was to safeguard sea traffic in the Baltic and the supply of the north wing of the 
Army. 15 
On 17 March 1941, the December directive was altered to reflect changes in the 
northern and southern portions of the operation. The Eleventh Army, rather than 
14 Ibid. 

15 Ibid. 
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undertake a sweeping movement out of Romania, was now merely to tie down the enemy 
in that area. The remainder of German forces concentrated in the western part of Europe 
were to be sent to the eastern part. 16 
The second area of preparation for the invasion of Russia was the economic one. 
The invasion was, after all, designed to seize vast agricultural land for future settlement by 
German farmers. This involved the eventual displacement of those currently living in the 
area to be occupied, but in the interim there existed the prospect of endless loot and 
ruthless exploitation. At the Nazi Party rally on 12 September 1936, Hitler asserted that 
the ores of the Urals, the forests of Siberia, and the wheat fields of the Ukraine could 
provide all Germans with a life of plenty. The seizure of food would cause famine in the 
rest of Russia, but the death of millions of Russians from starvation was perceived as an 
advantage, not a disaster. The mines of the Don and Donets basins and the forests of 
northern Russia would serve as fme substitutes for the riches of the Urals and Siberia of 
which Hitler had spoken of earlier. 17 
German planners had originally set May 15 as the earliest possible execution date 
for Barbarossa, but several unanticipated problems forced the Germans to postpone the 
inauguration of hostilities. The main logistical difficulties, due to the weather, were the 
difficulty of getting ready and the lack of equipment from the Reich. On April 30, Hitler 
met with his advisers and established June 22 as attack day. Throughout the planning 
process, the military leadership did not protest. They shared with Hitler the conviction 
16 Ibid. 
17 Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 189-190. 
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that the Wehrmacht would defeat the Soviets soundly in a swift battle of annihilation. 18 
The Germans possessed an inferior intelligence corps and had very little accurate 
intelligence. They would not be dissuaded by those whose estimates of Soviet strength 
were more perceptive, primarily because the prejudices against the Slavic peoples were 
reinforced by the euphoria of victory in the West. Having practically no agents inside the 
Soviet Union, except for those actually working for Moscow and feeding them 
disinformation, the Germans could add to their knowledge only by two other methods: 
signals intelligence and overflight. Their signals intelligence never penetrated higher-level 
Soviet codes and therefore, although useful for tactical details, never provided any major 
insights. 19 
The Germans accepted that the Soviets would ally with the British once Barbarossa 
began. However, Hitler and his military leaders saw this as inconsequential, believing that 
the Wehrmacht would crush the USSR before Britain could provide any aid. During the 
spring, Stalin received warnings from a variety of sources that a German attack was 
imminent. Prime Minister Winston Churchill (through Ultra intercepts) informed Stalin of 
a possible German attack.20 The United States as well, through its intelligence gathering 
network, informed Stalin more than once prior to 22 June 1941 that the Germans were 
planning to attack. The Soviet dictator set aside these warnings, along with information 
from his own intelligence services. As it turned out, Stalin did not exclude the possibility 
18 Wi 1t , War From the Top, p. 157 . 

19 Weinberg, A World At Arms, p. 189. 

20 Ultra was the British intelligence gathering agency during 

the Second World War. 
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of an invasion but expected Germany to make peace overtures toward Britain. Stalin also 
saw the German military buildup as an attempt at blackmail. 21 
At the beginning the opposing forces were relatively equal. The 152 German 
combat divisions included 19 panzer divisions (plus 3 brigades), 14 motorized infantry 
unit~, 111 infantry units, 1 cavalry force and 2 mountain divisions. Added to this number 
were 14 Rumanian and 21 Finnish divisions ready to enter the battle (other allies were to 
furnish troops soon after the fighting commenced). The German forces included 3,350 
tanks (281 Panzer I's, 743 Panzer II's, 808 35-ton Czech and 38-ton models, 979 Ill's and 
444 IV's).22 In addition, the Wehrmacht had 7,184 artillery pieces, 600,000 motor 
vehicles, and 625,000 horses. Of the 2,713 German aircraft, 2,080 were in service on 
June 22. Approximately 1,200 were bombers, 750 were fighter aircraft, and 130 
reconnaissance aircraft. German allies (Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, and 
Slovakia) contributed an additional 900 aircraft to the Axis cause. 23 
Each army group possessed forces and equipment deemed appropriate for the 
respective missions(s). There were 28 divisions under the command of Field Marshal 
Wilhelm von Leeb's Army Group North. Six of these were the armored and motorized 
divisions of General Erich Hoepner's Panzer Group 4. In Field Marshal Fedor von 
Bock's Army Group Center were 50 divisions, with an equivalent of 10 armored and 6 
motorized divisions. General Gerd von Rundstedt's Army Group South consisted of 40 
21 Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1973), p. 155. 
~ See Appendix II. 
23 Wilt, War From the Top, p. 158 
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divisions including 6 armored and 3 motorized divisions in Field Marshal Ewald von 
Kleist's Panzer Group L Thirty divisions were held in reserve. The infantry commanders 
of the various armies included a number of famous generals such as George von Kuchler, 
Ernst Busch, Adolf Strauss, Gunther von Kluge, Maximilian von Weichs, and Walter von 
Reichenau. Providing air support for Army Group North was General Alfred Keller's Air 
Fleet I with 593 aircraft. Supporting the crucial Army Group Center was Field Marshal 
Albert KesserJing's Air Fleet II with 1,367 aircraft. Assisting Army Group South was 
General Alexander Lohr's Air Fleet IV with 887 aircraft. Air Fleet V was to handle 
special assignmentS in the north. 24 As for the navy, its forces were concentrating on the 
n Battle of the Atlantic" and thus its activities in the Baltic were to be limited primarily to 
defense and supply duties. 25 
24 War Department, Handbook On German Military Forces 
(Washington, D.C., 17 December 1941), pp. 9-10, 89-91. 
A typical German division consisted of 14,952 enlisted 
men, 493 officers, 356 motorcycles and 1,040 motor vehicles. 
Each German division was broken down into regiments consisting 
of a headquarters regiment, a signal section regiment, 
motorcycle section, an infantry howitzer company, an antitank 
company, a light infantry column, three battalions (battalion, 
rifle company and machine-gun company). The German armored 
divisions (panzer divisions) consisted of 515 officers and 
10,347 enlisted men. The armored division was organized into 
three echelons: a reconnaissance echelon consisting of a 
motorized reconnaissance battalion, a tank echelon consisting 
of a tank brigade with 429 tanks, and an infantry echelon 
consisting of a mixed motorized command of all arms. The 
Germans were reported to have a minimum of twenty-five armored 
divisions in September 1941. The German motorized divisions 
included about 14,000 officers and men each. Each motorized 
division consisted of a motorized reconnaissance battalion, 
three motorized regiments, an antitank battalion, an 
antiaircraft battalion, divisional artillery, a pioneer 
battalion, a signal battalion, a medical battalion and 
divisional trains. 
25 wi 1t, War From The Top, p. 158 • 
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The planning and deployment for Operation Barbarossa were conducted on a large 
scale. The chief objective of Barbarossa was the destruction of the Soviet field forces. 
Hitler made it clear in late 1940 that Moscow was not all that important. From his 
perspective, the annihilation of Soviet field forces, not the capture of Moscow. guaranteed 
victory. This would produce a chain reaction culminating in a complete collapse, 
according to the fuehrer. 
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The attack on the Soviet Union commenced in the early hours of 22 June 1941. 
Although there had been last-minute alerts to Soviet units on some sectors of the front, the 
Germans achieved almost complete tactical and strategic sUrprise.26 In the opening part 
of the invasion, German Army Group North with three armies struck into the Baltic States, 
overran Lithuania in a few days, crossed the river Dvina at several places and controlled 
most of Latvia by the end of the first week of July. On the Central front, essentially a 
region between the Baltic States and the Pripet Marshes, Army Group Center with four 
armies smashed through the Soviet defenses and seized the eastern Polish territories 
annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939 in the first two weeks of fighting. Army Group 
South with three armies (in addition to the 11th army) drove across the southern part of 
pre-war Polish territories into the pre-1939 Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 27 
Army Group North assigned Panzer Group Hoepner the mission of seizing 
bridgeheads across the Dvina in order to reach Leningrad. The 8th Panzer Division, part 
of the 56th Panzer Corps, seized the road and rail bridges over the Dvina River within the 
first few days of the invasion. The 41st Panzer Corps then advanced further in the Soviet 
Union until it engaged in a major tank battle at Rossenie, encircling the Soviet heavy tanks 
and annihilating them. By 26 June, the 8th Panzer Division had crossed the Dvina, seized 
the city of Dvinsk and enlarged the resulting bridgehead to the north. Hoepner placed his 
forces on the Luga River near Porietscheje, only 110 kilometers from Leningrad. By early 
26 Alan F. Clark, Barbarossa (New York, William Morrow and 
Company, 1985), p.44. 
27 Weinberg, A World At Arms, pp. 264-265. The 11th Army was 
not attached to Army Group South. 
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September 1941, Army Group North had encircled Leningrad and besieged the city. 28 
Army Group South faced numerically superior Soviet forces and encountered fierce 
resistance. Consequently, Rumhtedt's units advanced slowly and became entangled in a 
fierce battIe with the Soviet 8th Armored Corps at Dubno. The Germans decimated the 
Soviet forces, broke through the enemy positions east of Polonnofe and pushed through to 
Berdichev. Rundstedt then struck with the bulk of Panzer Group I at Belaya Tserkov and 
continued to push southeasterly towards Kiev. Ultimately, at the end of July, Army 
Group South fought and won a great encirclement battle at U man, a victory that led to the 
disorderly retreat of the Soviet field armies across the Dnieper, away from Kiev (the main 
target for Army Group South). In mid-September, Army Group South encircled Kiev, 
taking over 665,000 Soviet prisoners. With this, German forces now occupied the whole 
Eastern Ukraine as well as large portions of Crimea. 29 
Of the three German army groups involved in Barbarossa, von Bock's Army Group 
Center enjoyed the most spectacular successes in the initial stages of the invasion. This 
army group then swept into central Russia, grabbed another 300,000 prisoners and seized 
Minsk and Smolensk by late July. By the end of September, General Heinz Guderian 
captured Glukov and Orel. By early October German tank units had encircled the Rzhev-
Viazma defense line and captured Kaluga, as well as Kalinin, a few days later. Mozhaisk, 
50 miles from Moscow, fell on October 18. The Germans then closed in on Moscow 
D Ibid., pp. 51-54. For a further discussion of the siege 
of Leningrad, refer to Harrison Salisbury's book, The Siege of 
Leningrad. 
29 Alexander Werth, Russia At War (New York: E.P. Dutton & 
Co., 1964), pp. 206-207. 
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from all directions. The battle of Moscow, codenamed Operation Typhoon was now 
launched. By October 20th, Moscow proclaimed a state of siege.3D 
As German forced moved toward Moscow, Stalin placed Marshal Georgi Zhukov 
in charge of the city's defense. Zhukov established reserve units around the suburbs of 
Moscow in the event a counteroffensive was launched. 31 When the Soviets gained a 
numerical tank superiority, as a result of the German 4th Panzer Division being destroyed 
at Mtsensk, these Soviet reserve units launched a series of counteroffensives that, along 
with the weather, decimated and demoralized the German troops. The Germans ceased 
their offensive in early November to decide what they should do next.32 
The Germans decided to launch another offensive on Moscow with what remained 
of the German army. By this time however, Zhukov had more than doubled his strength. 
The Germans broke into Lin north of Moscow and in the w~i to lstra (the point nearest to 
Moscow they ever reached in force). Due to logi~iical problems and the cold, the 
Germans began to lose the military initiative. At the beginning of November the Russians 
had started an offensive against Leeb's positions in the Tikhvin-Volkhov bulge. Guderian 
attacked Tula but was ferociously repe1Jed by Soviet forces. The Soviet 4th and 52nd 
armies reopened the Leningrad-Tikhivin-Moscow railway and staged an offensive that 
prevented the reinforcement of Army Group Center. Guderian's offensive against the 
~ Ibid., p. 230. 
31 Zhukov had begun planning a major counteroffensive to 
launch against the Germans when the time was right. However, 
it took several weeks for this plan to get approved by Stalin. 
32 Clark, Barbarossa, pp. 159-61. 
Zaraisk-Mikhailov line and Ryazan railway was halted. Kleist was ejected from Rostov in 
the south by fresh Soviet armies.33 
By November 30, Zhukov received final approval from Stalin for the winter 
counteroffensive that had been in the planning stages for several weeks. On the 5th of 
December, Zhukov launched a major counteroffensive against Hoepner's, Kluge's and 
Guderian's armies around Moscow. All three of these armies lost contact with each other. 
The Germans position became fragmented. By the 6th of December the German drive in 
the Soviet Union in 1941 came to a halt.34 
TI Ibid., pp. 168-177. 
34 I b'd1. ., 260. 
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Operation Barbarossa's failure has been a topic of debate for more than fifty years. 
Various members of the German High Command, who survived the war, were interviewed 
immediately after the conclusion of the war in Europe in 1945. In these interviews, each 
genera1 gave his own opinion as to why the Wehrmacht failed to achieve a decisive victory 
in the USSR in 1941. Many of the German generals, including Rundstedt, Kleist, 
Blumentritt and Manstein, cited factors ranging from logistical/strategic problems, weather 
and Hitler himself. What is important to remember is that these generals blamed everyone 
but themselves when stating why the invasion failed. 
One of the fITst questions asked was what effect the Balkan campaign had on 
Barbarossa. Did the Balkan campaign cause a vital delay in its ,launching? The invasion 
of Russia had been postponed from May 1941 until 22 June 1941, resulting in a change in 
strategy. Field Marshal von Kleist stated, "the forces employed in the Ba1kans were not 
large compared with our total strength, but the proportion of tanks employed there was 
high. The bulk of the tanks that came under me for the offensive against the Russian front 
in Southern Poland had taken part in the Balkan offensive, and needed overhaul, while 
their crews needed a rest. "35 Field Marshal von Rundstedt agreed that this delay, in 
combination with the weather, hampered the preparations of his army group. The views 
of Field Marsha1s von Rundstedt and von Klei~1 were naturally conditioned by the extent 
to which the offensive on their front depended on the return of these armored divisions. 
Other generals attached less importance to the effect of the Balkan campaign. For 
example, they emphasized that the main role in the offensive against Russia remained 
35 B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York, 
William Morrow & Co., 1948), p. 169. 
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allotted to Field Marshal von Bock's Army Group Center and that the chances of victory 
principally turned on is progress, not the delay in the invasion itself. 
However, after further study, the decisive factor in the change of the invasion 
timing happened as a result of the coup d'etat in Yugoslavia on 27 March 1941. 
Yugoslavia had ju~i committed to a pact with the Axis powers. Hitler became so incensed 
by the upsetting news that he ordered an invasion of Yugoslavia. The additional forces, 
land and air, required for the invasion of Russia required a greater commitment than the 
Greek campaign alone needed. Thus, Hitler decided to take his fuller and more fateful 
decision to put off the intended start of the attack on Russia. 36 In essence, according to 
Field Marshals von Kleist and von Rundstedt, Hitler's poor decision making represents 
another factor in the downfall of the German armies in Russia. 
The next question asked about the invasion was why it failed. Field Marshal 
Ewald von Kleist pointed to the weather, Russian strategy and the Russian ability to 
produce reserves. For example, he stated, "The main cause of our failure can be blamed 
on the early winter of 1941, coupled with the way the Russians repeatedly gave ground 
rather than let themselves be drawn into a decisive battle such as we were seeking. But 
long before winter came the chances had been diminished owing to the repeated delays in 
the advance that were caused by bad roads and mud. The 'black earth' of the Ukraine 
could be turned into mud by ten minutes rain, ~iopping all movement until it dried. That 
became a heavy handicap in a race with time. Russia also lacked railways, we were 
unable to bring up supplies to our advancing troops. The Russians received continual 
% Ibid., p. 170. 
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reinforcements from their back areas, as they feU back. It seemed to us that as soon as we 
defeated one force, a fresh one arrived to take its place ...31 
General Gunther Blumentritt endorsed Kleist's view, except for the point about the 
Russians yielding ground. "00 the Moscow route", Blumentritt stated, "the principalJine 
of advance, they repeatedly held on long enough to be encircled, The badness of the 
roads became our worst handicap, Faulty intel1igence had underestimated Soviet strength, 
The restoration of railway traffic became delayed by the change of gauge beyond the 
Russian frontier. The supply problem in the Russian campaign became a very serious 
problem, complicated by local conditions." 38 
Another factor stated by Field Marshal von Kleist emphasized that the Germans 
lacked the definite advantage in the air they had enjoyed in their 1940 invasion of the 
West. He stated, "At several stages in the advance my panzer forces were handicapped 
through lack of cover overhead, due to fighter airfields being too far back. Moreover, 
such air superiority as we enjoyed during the opening months remained local rather than 
general. We owed it to the superior skill of our airmen, not to a superiority in 
numbers...39 As German forces pushed deeper and deeper into Russia, the Luftwaffe 
could not stretch its air cover. 
Field Marshal Erich von Man~1ein, one of the ablest German commanders, gave 
two reasons why the invasion failed. First, and foremo~1, he blamed Hitler for 
31 I b'd ., pp. 175-176.1 

38 I b'd
1 • I p. 176. 

39 I b'd ., pp. 176-177.
1 
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underrating the resources of the Soviet Union and the fighting qualities of the Red Army. 
Manstein also went on to state that Hitler's strategic policy, which was the demolition of 
the Soviet system quickly, and his political actions were diametrically opposed to each 
other. This, in tum, prevented Hitler from winning the quick, decisive victory he 
envisioned. Second, Manstein argued that Hitler failed to achieve a uniform strategic 
policy between himself and the OKH. The Barbarossa Directive laid down the general 
intention of the operation (destroy the Soviet Army in a quick, decisive victory). 
However, according to Manstein, this was nothing more than a strategic or tactical 
formula. For example, he pointed to the halt at Smolensk as a change in the strategic 
o~jective. Furthermore, Manstein stated that a debate over the basic strategy around July 
1941 ensued. The OKH wanted to drive towards Moscow while Hitler was interested in 
seizing territory that he believed would cripple the Soviet war economy. It was this tug­
of-war over territorial objectives that prevented the victory in the summer of 1941.40 
Genera] Heinz Guderian, Commander of Panzer Group III (Army Group Center), 
stated that the delay of the invasion of Russia until the summer of 1941, as a result of the 
Balkan campaign. Far more significant for Guderian was the underestimation of the 
Russians as enemies. Hitler attached little importance to the reports of Russian strength as 
compared to the reports of Russian industry. Hitler had convinced the OKH and OKW 
that a quick, decisive victory was inevitable for Germany. As a result, no provisions were 
made for the distribution of winter clothing. Another reason cited by Guderian was the 
issuing of an order by the OKW. This order ~1ated that excessive abuses committed 
40 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago, Henry Regnery 
Company, 1958), pp.175-178. 
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against Russian peasants and prisoners by German soldiers would not fall under military 
law violations. The soldiers responsible would be dealt with at the discretion of their unit 
commander. Military discipline was threatened with a complete breakdown as a result of 
this order. Guderian also made reference to the widening gulf between Hitler's opinion 
and the OKW concerning strategic objectives. For example, a conference at Novy Brissov 
was nothing more than a debate between Hitler and the German army concerning the 
strategic plan. Was it going to be Moscow or the industrial area around Leningrad? 
Guderian and General Hoth advocated a primary thrust towards Moscow. Hitler wanted 
the primary thrust to be against the industrial area around Leningrad.41 
One important thing to remember is when these generals gave their explanations, 
they were on trial for their lives in Nuernberg. They were not going to incriminate 
themselves in any way, shape or form. Of course they tended to blame Hitler, the 
weather, lack of supplies, etc. A majority of the testimonies given by these high ranking 
officers were given for self-serving interests. First hand accounts are not always accurate, 
especially when there is nobody to contradict these people. 
Western historians, who have written about Barbarossa, have clearly been 
influenced by German explanations. Michael Chemiavsky, in his article -Barbarossa\ 
cited two important reasons why the invasion failed: Russian qualities and Hitler's 
mistakes. Russian qualities are three in number: the Russian climate, inexhaustible 
manpower reserves which overwhelm the Germans and the primitiveness of Russian 
communications. Hitler initiated a two-front war by his attack against Russia; he 
41 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York, Ballantine Books, 
1957), pp. 124-126, 137, 153. 
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postponed the opening of the campaign from May to June in order to dispose of the 
Balkans, and this delay, coupled with the onset of a particularly severe winter, prevented 
the German Army from finishing the destruction of the Soviet forces. The Russians were 
viewed to be subhuman in the eyes of German forces. They lived off the land and had 
inexhaustible manpower reserves that overwhelmed the Germans. The Russian winter was 
another reason cited by German first-hand accounts.42 
Barry Leach, author of German Strategy Against Russia, was influenced greatly 
by the first hand accounts given by the Germans at the close of the war. He stated the 
underestimation of size and fighting spirit of the Soviet forces and the quality of their new 
equipment, especially tanks and aircraft, confronted the Wehrmacht with unexpected 
difficulties. By the third week of July the combat strength of the Panzer and motorized 
divisions had fallen to about 60 % of normal in Army Group Center. In some of the 
Panzer divisions of Army Group South it dropped to 40%. Early in July, Halder 
calculated that by the end of the month only 431 tanks would be available from the OKH 
reserve and current production to replace those destroyed or broken down out of the 
original total of 3350. But to make matters worse, Hitler gave orders that new tanks 
should be kept in Germany for equipping fresh Panzer divisions for use in the offensives 
planned for 1942 in the Middle East.43 
Alan Wilt, author of War From The Top, was another historian who was 
42 Michael Cherniavsky, The Yale Review: A National 
Quarterly (New Haven: Yale University Press, June 1962), vol 
LI No.4, pp.548-554. 
43 Leach, German strategy Against Russia, p. 203. 
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influenced by these first hand accounts. The reasons were a combination of German errors 
and Soviet fortitude. Germany seriously underestimated their Russian enemy. They had 
underestimated the tank: and infantry strength of the Soviet armies. Furthermore, despite 
the campaign's overriding importance, the Germans were simply not prepared for the 
personnel and equipment losses they suffered. German resources as well as their 
productive capacity were insufficient to overcome the attrition, maintenance and repair 
difficulties brought on by Barbarossa.44 
R.H.S Stolfi, author of Hitler's Panzers East, is another historian whose 
explanations concerning Barbarossa's failure mirror those of the German generals. He 
puts the blame for Barbarossa's failure at Hitler's feet. He ~1ated that Hitler lost sight of 
the strategic purpose of the invasion which was the destruction of the Soviet Army in a 
quick, decisive manner. He was more interested in economic objectives rather than 
strategic ones. For example, Stolfi refers to the decision of the July-August conference in 
1941 as the decisive event. 45 
As you can see there are striking similarities between the accounts given by 
German generals shortly after the conclusion of World War II and the explanations offered 
by Western historians. Historians such as Leach, Wilt, Stolfi and Cherniavsky were all 
influenced in their writing by the general's explanations. Each group of explanations 
blamed the failure of Barbarossa on Hitler, the War in the Balkans, the early onset of 
winter and the strategic debate between Hitler and the OKW concerning where the primary 
44 Wilt, War From the Top, p. 162-164. 
~ R.H.S. stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East (Novato, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1991), pp.202-212. 
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thrust of the invasion should be directed. It is this debate that has spurred a reexamination 
of the failure of Barbarossa for accuracy and validity. 
Williamson Murray, the author of "Barbarossa., argues that the German military 
deserves a big share of the responsibility for Germany's failure to defeat Russia in 1941. 
He points out that German commanders endorsed Hitler's disastrous strategic and political 
approach in every respect. Hitler failed to set clear goals for the invasion. He involved 
the Wehrmacht in a great spring campaign in the Balkans that seemingly delays the start of 
Barbarossa, by as much as five weeks. After the invasion of Russia began, he temporized 
for much of August as to what the next stage of the campaign should be. He overruled 
the army and diverted substantial forces from the central area of the invasion for a drive 
into the Ukraine in September. 46 
The racial ideology the Nazi's possessed concerning the Soviet people proved 
extremely disastrous for the Germans. By 1941 Stalin had killed millions of Soviet 
citizens; millions more remained in NKVD (secret police) slave-labor camps, where the 
inmates were starved, beaten, and/or starved to death. The horror of Hitler's invasion 
policies, the callousness of German troops in their ideological crusade, and the extent of 
Nazi atrocities guaranteed that Soviet resistance would not crumble. The Soviet people 
had to choose between the lesser of two evils: Hitler or Stalin. The Soviet people 
decided to support "Papa Stalin. "47 
Other factors in the German defeat sprang directly from the operational and logistic 
46 Williamson Murray, ItBarbarossa, If The Quarterly Journal of 
Military History, no. 4 (New York, MHQ Inc., 1992), p. 9. 
47 Ibid., p. 10. 
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assumptions upon which the German military planned Barbarossa. OKH planning 
originally targeted Moscow as the objective of the campaign, which Franz Halder, chief of 
the general staff, and the most senior generals believed would guarantee the fmal 
breakdown of the Soviet regime. Hitler, however, argued in a series of conferences in 
December 1940 that, for economic and political reasons, the most important strategic 
targets were Leningrad and the Ukraine. From this point on, Halder left unstated what the 
strategic objectives of the campaign should be after the initial destruction of the Red Army 
in the border area (Halder gave into Hitler). Instead, the OKH merely laid out the first 
stage of the advance, leaving the continuation of the campaign up in the air. 48 
The greatest flaw in the preparations for Barbarossa was logistical in nature. 
German planners calculated that after an advance of 600 kilometers, movement forward 
would have to halt for a considerable period of time to allow for resupply and the 
establishment of new forward supply dumps. However, German troops crossed the 
frontier with only a basic load of ammunition. Given the rapid advance of German forces, 
ammunition and fuel were in desperately short supply from Barbarossa's earliest days. 
German troops had to obtain food and fodder from the Russian and Ukrainian peasants, 
further damaging relations with conquered popUlation. Finally, the whole resupply effort 
depended on the repair of Soviet raiJroads, particularly the Smolensk-to-Brest Litovsk Jine. 
But since railroad tracks were generally secured well after the roads, repair work began 
only after considerable delays. As a result, railroad troops were given the lowest priority 
48 Ibid., p. 11. 
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in the German army. 49 
By the end of July, German operations came to a grinding halt. The lead elements, 
the panzer and motorized infantry divisions, ran out of fuel and ammunition. Restrictions 
had to be put on the number of shells that artillery units could fire. On the primitive 
roads with their heat, dust, and deep glutinous mud when it rained, the German logistic 
system began to fall apart. By July 11, after just nineteen days, 25 % of German supply 
vehicles permanently broke down. The panzer divisions could not repair damaged tanks 
and other vehicles because parts could not get through. The panzer and motorized infantry 
divisions became dangerously exposed as a result. Soviet reserve forces arrived in 
increasing numbers. These counterattacks exacerbated the dangerous German shortage of 
ammunition. In tum, the need for ammunition placed a further ~1rain on the diminishing 
number of supply vehicles, which drastically curtailed the Germans' ability to supply fuel 
to the front. 50 
During August a lot of squabbling took place within the German high command, in 
particular between Hitler and the OKW on one hand and the OKH and the front 
commanders on the other. The former argued that the German army, rather than push 
eastward broadly, should focus its efforts on the Ukraine, to the south, and on Leningrad, 
to the north. Hitler emphasized his belief that Moscow held little significance either 
politically or economically. But the OKH and the front commanders strongly advocated a 
resumption of the advance on Moscow. There were other serious quarrels within the 
e Ibid. 

50 Ibid., pp. 11-14. 
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senior leadership over tactical and operational issued, particularly over the number of 
Soviet troops escaping from the encirclements, but all of this squabbling seemed more a 
symptom of German troubles than a cause of them. 51 
The weather problem closed in on the Germans almost immediately. In conditions 
of unimaginable misery, in a sea of mud, the German advance stopped. This reprieve 
gave the Red Army the time it needed to concentrate its few reserves in front of Moscow. 
The Germans' persistence in spite of the season underlined the weaknesses of their military 
system. The exclusive concentration on operational concerns, on winning the next battle, 
to the exclusion of other vital ones created the preconditions for the coming defeat. In a 
discussion with chiefs of ~1aff of Army Group Center, General Halder hoped for six weeks 
without snow, to allow German troops to reach Vologda, Stalingrad and Maikop.52 
In November the cold weather arrived. The fact that it froze up the glutinous mud 
returned some movement to the battlefield. But at the same time, the lack of winter-
weight oils and winter clothing, and shortages in every other area, created a nightmare for 
German troops struggling forward. At times the cold became so intense that the troops 
~1arted gasoline fires under their tanks to warm up the oil sufficiently so that the engines 
could tum over. (The Soviet units were better prepared with lightweight oil.) On the night 
of December 4, the temperature fell to 25 degrees below zero Fahrenheit; one regiment 
suffered 300 frostbite casualties. In these hopeless conditions, the advance halted at the 
gates of Moscow. The next day, the Soviet Army shifted to a counter offensive and the 
51 Ibid., p. 14. 

52 Ibid. 
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On the basis of the evidence I have examined, it is my view that Nazi Germany 
failed to achieve a quick, decisive victory in the Soviet Union primarily because of poor 
10gi~1:ical preparation and strategic indecisiveness. The logistical preparations made on 
Germany's part were optimistic to say the least. The German supply lines were ill­
equipped to handle an invasion of this magnitude. These lines could only support German 
forces for a 600 kilometer push into Russia. After that, the Soviet railroad would be the 
main supply carrier. However, the Soviet railroad could not handle the supply effort 
either. The Soviet railroads had a wider gauge than lines in Western Europe. As German 
tanks were destroyed in battle or damaged beyond repair, there were no replacement parts 
available. With panzer units only fighting at 50% capacity, the Soviet chances for victory 
increased greatly on all fronts. 
The strategic dilemma faced by the German High Command proved to be one of 
the most important factors leading to the failure of Operation Barbarossa. Directive No.21 
stated that the primary objective of Barbarossa was the destruction of the Soviet Army. 
During the first six weeks of the invasion, German forces conquered a huge amount of 
territory. However, by mid-July 1941, Hitler and all of his advisors were meeting to 
decide where the primary effort of the invasion should be directed .... Moscow or 
Leningrad? The OKW advised that the primary thrust should be made against Moscow. 
However, Hitler disagreed and advised a primary thrust towards Leningrad. This is where 
I feel they lost the war. Hitler was no longer committed to the primary goal of the 
campaign stated in Directive No. 21, which was the destruction of the Soviet Army. 
Deciding the course of the war as it unfolds is a clear indication of failure. 
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From the research I conducted concerning the German explanations of why 
Barbarossa failed, I can only conclude that the explanations were self-serving. Most of the 
explanations given do not relate to why the invasion failed as a whole. The cold weather, 
the Balkan campaign and the subhuman nature of the Soviets did not doom the operation 
altogether. The cold weather was one of the factors that prevented German forces from 
taking Moscow, but not a filctor that prevented the Germans from destroying the Soviet 
Army. Even if Barbarossa had started in May there is no evidence that the Red Army 
could have been de~iroyed. Furthermore, the Soviet's subhuman nature, as described by 
German accounts, could not have sealed Barbarossa's failure. 
Could the Soviet Union be defeated in a quick, decisive campaign of several 
months duration at the· most? I do believe that this could be achieved with the appropriate 
planning. First, Germany would have to set clear strategic goals and stick to them. 
Second, Germany would have to fmd a way to resupply their forces deep within the Soviet 
Union. Third, a continuous flow of supplies would have to be maintained. 
The next que~1ion I want to deal with is the whole idea of a quick, decisive victory 
and what led Hitler to decide this was possible. He believed that the Soviets were 
subhuman and incapable of beating the mighty German Army. It did not matter to Hitler 
just how many divisions the Russians could muster, an inferior people can always beat a 
weaker enemy. Plus, the purges of the Soviet Army in the 1930's had disrupted the 
military structure in Russia. With this in his favor, he believed that the Soviet Army 
could be destroyed in a quick, decisive campaign. I believe that Hitler's ideology did not 
allow him to see the possibility of failure. Hitler's belief in a quick, decisive victory 
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against the Soviet Army with tittle regard for concrete strategic goals implies a man out of 
touch with reality. 
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Appendix I 
"Directive No. 21 stated that the German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush 
Soviet Russia in a quick campaign (Operation Barbarossa) even before the conclusion of 
the war against England. For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available 
units, with the reservation that the occupied territories must be secured against surprises. 
For the Luftwaffe it will be a matter of releasing such strong forces for the Eastern 
campaign in support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations can be 
counted on and that damage to eastern German territory by enemy air attacks will be as 
slight as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the ea!!.i is limited by the 
requirement that the entire combat and armament area dominated by us must remain 
adequately protected against enemy air attacks and that the offensive operations against 
England, particularly against her supply lines, must not be permitted to break: down. The 
main effort of the Navy will remain unequivocally directed against England, even during 
an Eastern campaign. I shall order the concentration against Soviet Russia possibly eight 
weeks before the intended beginning of operations. Preparations requiring more time to 
get under way are to be started now, if this has not yet been done, and are to be 
completed by 15 May 1941. It is of decisive importance, however, that the intention to 
attack does not become apparent. The preparations of the High Commands are to be made 
on the following basis: 
I. General Purpose 
The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring 
operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges; and the retreat of units capable of 
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combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented. In quick pursuit a line is 
then to be reached from which the Russian air force objective of the operation is to 
establish a cover against Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangel. Then, in 
case of necessity, the last industrial area left to Russia in the Urals can be eliminated by 
the Luftwaffe. In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly 
lose its bases and thus will no longer be able to fight. Effective intervention by the 
Russian Air Force is to be prevented by powerful blows at the beginning of the operation. 
II. Probable allies and their tasks 
1. On the wings of our operation the active participation of Romania and Finland 
in the war against Soviet Russia is to be expected. The High Command will in due time 
arrange and determine in what form the armed forces of the two countries will be placed 
under German command at the time of their intervention. 
2. It will be the task of Romania to support with selected forces the attack of the 
German southern wing, at least in its beginnings; to pin the enemy down where German 
forces are not committed; and otherwise to render auxiliary service in the rear area. 
3. Finland will cover the concentration of the German North Group (parts of the 
XXI Group) withdrawn from Norway and will operate jointly with it. Besides, Finland 
will be assigned the task of eliminating Hango. 
4. It may be expected that Swedish railroads and highways will be available for 
the concentration of the German North Group, from the start of operations at the 
latest. "54 
54 Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals, 
p.958-960. 
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Appendix II 
1. The Panzer I tank had five bogie wheels with spokes, the last four being 
connected by an outside girder bearer. The rear idler wheel was almost on the ground. 
Two Jight machine guns were mounted coaxially on roller type mounting. The turret had 
a rounded back, was on the right-hand side of the tank, and had a very low silhouette. 
2. The Panzer II tank had five large bogie wheels, Christie type and four track 
support rollers. The turret was similar to the Panzer I. It had one heavy machine gun 
(with a very long barrel) and one light machine gun in roller type mounting. The back of 
the turret was flat. The tank had a wide track base, very low silhouette and streamlined. 
3. The Panzer III tank had six small independent bogie wheels with heavy rubber 
tires and eight small bogie wheels. There were five large, independently sprung wheels. 
It was a Christie type tank with three track support rollers. The turret was similar to the 
Panzer II but had a large door on each side. There was a 37-mm gun and light machine 
gun mounted in a bulge-shaped mount. Built into the rear of the turret and centrally 
situated was a small round lookout conning tower. 
4. The Panzer IV tank had eight small bogie wheels, four bogies and four track 
support rollers. The turret was identical to that of the Panzer III tank but with a 75-mm 
gun. Horizontal engine air louvres were at the rear on each side of the built-up hull. 
5. The Panzer V IVI tank was almost covered by an armored skirting with ten 
small bogie wheels and one independent bogie wheel. It also had four track support 
roners. The turret was round at the rear; surmounted by an observation cupola to the 
rear. There was a massive gun mount, with either a 105-mm gun mounted below a 37­
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mm gun, or a 75-mm gun mounted at the side of a 37-mm gun. There were two small 
auxiliary turrets with one light machine gun each, one forward to the right of the driver 
and one behind of the main turret on the left. 55 
55 War Department, Handbook on German Military Forces, p.99. 
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